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Abstract
Moral values inuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signi-
cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what
they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They
increase their esteem  and self-esteem for those who perform in excess of the standard
and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from
the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We
examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract
in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-
teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The
desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual atti-
tudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments,
labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of
equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav-
iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type.
Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality.
In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers
work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased
in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the
egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of
equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the
model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and
toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
Moral values are important determinants of individual behavior and of social interactions. De-
viations from moral standards produce self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride, extensively
studied in Social Psychology. Guilt and pride a¤ect both self-esteem and the esteem or empathy
for others: our sentiments. These psychological reactions are termed self-regulatory because
they induce compensating changes in our behavior.1 The premise of this paper is that once
moral values are considered then di¤erent sentiments may a¤ect individual behaviour and the
concern for others thereby leading to the support of alternative policies or social institutions.
Conversely, since policies or institutions, the social contract, generally a¤ect behaviour, they can
inuence sentiments. Therefore, morally induced sentiments, individual behaviour and political
choices must be treated jointly.
To investigate this reciprocal relationship between moral values, sentiments and the social
contract, we consider the issue of voting over scal redistribution with endogenous labour supply
à la Meltzer and Richard (1981) (henceforth MR). As exposited there, the explanation for
redistributive taxation holds that the outcome under majority rule voting reects the preferences
of the median voter.2 In contrast to the purely egoistic model of MR, we assume that agents
are altruistic and that sentiments are endogenous.3 We consider agents with moral standards
or values pertaining to work, regarding hard work as good and laziness as bad. This moral
judgement on the observed behaviour inuences the esteem that each individual has for the
others and hence the attitudes toward redistribution.4
Formally, we provide a model in which a continuum of agents di¤er in their productivities.
For simplicity, we assume there are two types of individuals, skilled and unskilled, with the
latter comprising the majority of the population. Each agent supplies labour in return for
a competitive wage, and earnings are subject to a purely redistributive proportional tax the
proceeds of which are distributed uniformly as a per capita transfer. Individual utility has two
components: private and social. The private utility depends on consumption and leisure as well
as, consistently with the own work values, the self-worth deriving from the perception of oneself
as industrious or lazy. The social component consists of the weighted well-being of the others.
We distinguish between the weight given to the aggregate well-being of the others relative to
the own private utility  that is, the empathy or esteem for the other and how this aggregate
weight is allocated among the di¤erent individuals  that is, the esteem felt for each one
depending on whether we consider them as industrious or lazy.
The endogenous variables in our model  labour supply, sentiments and taxes  are de-
termined as follows. Given their sentiments and the tax schedule, agents make labour supply
1The ndings in social psychology and sociology on the relationship between moral standards and senti-
ments/emotions is discussed in more details in section 2.
2 It is now well recognized that the implication of this classical theory that higher income inequality leads
to greater equilibrium redistribution fails to hold in practice. Perotti (1996) reports the lack of any signicant
correlation. Rodriguez (1999) fails to nd evidence within US states. In line with the discussion we present in
Section 6, some authors, like De Mello and Tiongson (2006) also nd a possibly nonmonotonic relationship in
the OECD countries. Finally Milanovic (2000), despite nding a negative correlation between inequality and
redistribution, nds no evidence that the median voter receives income gains from scal redistribution. See also
Bénabou (1996 and 2000) for an extensive surveys of the evidence.
3To the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical paper to address the political economy of taxation with
altruistic agents is Kranich (2001). Snyder and Kramer (1988) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) study the choice
of redistribution when individuals care about fairness.
4The role of (work) values on voting behaviour has been recognised for a long time (see Kinder and Sears
(1988)). Recent empirical investigations of individual preferences for taxation in economics provide support the
view that voters preferences are social and driven by moral values. See Luttmer (2001), Fong (2001) and Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005), among others. In particular Corneo and Grüner (2002) nd that work values are key to
explaining individual preferences for redistribution. These results are in line with the data from the World Values
Survey as discussed in Section 6.
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decisions. Since there is a continuum of individuals, the labour supply decision has no impact
on the well-being of the others and is therefore made on the basis of the private preferences
only. Then, having determined the labour supplies, we assume agents evaluate such behaviour
relative to this standard, increasing their relative esteem (or self-esteem) for those who exceed
the standard and decreasing their esteem for those who fail to meet the standard. Here, we
take the standard to be the average or mean labour supply. Finally, given their sentiments
individuals vote over redistribution anticipating the labour supply e¤ects of taxation. Taxes
have an economy-wide e¤ect and hence the choice of taxation is determined on the basis of the
social as well as the private components of individual preferences. Since a majority of agents
are unskilled, the median tax policy will be that preferred by an unskilled worker.
A politico-economic equilibrium of our model consists of a vector of labour supplies, senti-
ments and tax policy such that each is optimal given the other components and all such variables
are compatible. There are two types of politico-economic equilibria in our model. In a cohesive
equlibrium all individuals conform to the ethical norm and supply equal quantities of labour. In
equilibrium there is an inverse relation between the level of altruism (empathy for others) and
individual skill level. Furthermore, each individuals esteem for others is allocated across the
two types of agents in proportion to their population. Hence, it is not biased in favor or against
either type. Finally, the chosen tax rate is highrelative to the second type of equilibrium. In
contrast, in a clustered equilibrium, society is divided into two groups or clusters. One consists
of the most productive individuals, who work above the mean and garner maximal esteem, while
the other consists of the least productive individuals, who work below the mean and earn little
social esteem.5 In a clustered equilibrium the chosen tax rate might be lower than in a cohesive
society and agentssentiments are biased against the poor, that is, the productive individuals
receive a disproportionately large share of social esteem. Whether an economy becomes cohesive
or clustered depends on the degree of inequality of pre-tax income or skill level. If inequality is
below a critical level then cohesion results, whereas higher inequality leads to social clustering.
There are four main implications of our theory: (i) Equilibrium degree of redistribution: it
needs not be monotonic with respect to inequality. Throughout the range of cohesive equilibria,
higher inequality leads to higher redistribution. This positive relation is preserved at higher
 but moderate  levels of inequality. However, at some critical value of inequality the bias
in sentiments in favor of the skilled becomes su¢ ciently strong so that any further increase in
inequality leads to a decrease in redistribution. It follows that we might observe one society with
low pre-tax earnings inequality because it has remained cohesive choosing to redistribute more
than a society with larger inequality that is clustered. Therefore, the model does not support the
unconditional prediction of a negative relationship between inequality and redistribution. (ii)
Distribution of labour supply: for low levels of inequality we should observe little or no dispersion
in labour supply, but for high levels we should observe a widening gap between the labour hours
of skilled and unskilled workers. (iii) Work motivation and skills: in each equilibrium individual
skill levels are inversely related to individual moral work motivation (associated to a lower self-
esteem induced by guilt). Hence the unskilled/poor workers face larger moral work pressure
than the skilled. (iv) Social consideration: in cohesive economies individual altruism will be
uniformly allocated over the entire population, whereas in clustered economies higher inequality
will lead to increasing bias in favor of the rich and against the poor. Hence, attitudes toward
the poor are more likely to be favorable in economies with low inequality and critical when
inequality is high. We discuss these implications by comparing cross-country data for a set of
OECD countries. Using both objective and survey data, we compare inequality, redistribution,
labour supply and attitudes toward work and toward the poor. While the latter (attitudes) are
5 If there were more than two skill levels, then it is possible there would exist a third cluster in equilibrium,
where those in the middle group would conform to the standard. We discuss this possibility in more detail in
Section 6.
2
clearly di¢ cult to measure, nevertheless, and with due caution, we nd that the data appear
broadly in line with each of the predictions.
This paper is related to several literatures/issues. In addition to the topic of voting over
taxes, the paper also contributes to the literature on endogenous preferences and the economic
analysis of socio-psychological factors and moral norms. Elster (1989) argues that e¤ort pro-
vision is crucially inuenced by work norms. In our model, the violation of the work norms
produces psychological costs. Following the Social Psychology literature on self-regulatory emo-
tions, individuals experience the self-conscious emotions of guilt and pride as they fall short or
go beyond what their moral values dictate as proper behavior. These emotions serve a self-
regulatory function: the feeling of guilt for violating the moral standard increases the moral
pressure and induces an individual to undertake reparatory actions. As a result, moral values
and economic incentives jointly determine individual behaviour. Several important contribu-
tions, most notably by Bénabou (2002) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002 and 2003), have investi-
gated the related concepts of self-condence and the role of individual beliefs for self-regulation.
Di¤erently from these contributions, however, our focus is on the role of moral values in shaping
self-esteem and, crucially, esteem for others rather than investigating the role of self-condence
and beliefs under uncertainty or lack of information on own characteristics [more in Section 2].
The papers by Mo¢ t (1983) and Besley and Coate (1992) also study the role of moral values
and of moral persuasion. They consider the case in which there are social norms against living on
transfers and agents face the threat of welfare stigma. Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999)
have extended this analysis to include voting over welfare benets. There, individuals can choose
between working full-time or being unemployed and receiving a subsidy. The psychic costs,
i.e., the stigma of living on welfare depends on the prevalence of such behaviour. Hence, the
observed behaviour of others inuences ones attitude toward deviating from the norm, and the
cost of deviating may a¤ect the decision to do so. Our model also considers the psychic costs
of deviating from the social norm. However, it departs from the work of Lindbeck, Nyberg, and
Weibull (1999) in two essential ways. First, we focus on the intensity of work e¤ort, which in our
model varies continuously, versus the discrete choice of working full-time or living on transfers.6
Second, it is crucial in our model that moral judgements befall on others as well as oneself. It
is the contrast between normal behaviour and observed behaviour what inuences esteem.7
This allows us to study how inequality and moral values shape social esteem and, accordingly,
preferences for redistribution and the social contract.8
Finally, the paper also contributes to the recent debate on the interpretation of the observed
di¤erences in "social contracts", in particular between the US and the EU.9 Several papers
6Lindbeck et al (1999) consider the case of full work vs full unployment and the moral component of the utility
function is additively separable (thus ruling out any inuence on the substitution of labour for consumption). For
them this is a lump-sum psychological cost. A large body of research, however, document interactions between
economic and non economic incentives. Deci et al (1999) showed denitively that tangible rewards undermine
intrinsic motivation. Kehr (2004) nds that this is the case unless the extrinsic motivation do not deactivate task
enjoyment. Falk and Fehr (2002, p. 713) make the point that the convention to take the disutility of e¤ort as
exogenously given induces economists to disregard potential determinants of the (dis) utility of e¤ort.
7Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003) and Akerlof and Kranton (2004) also consider cases in which agents
derive utility from conforming with a social norm or belonging to a group. The former considers a similar question
of voluntary contributions to a public good, and the latter investigates group identication and identity. Both
focus on self-image rather than passing moral judgement on others.
8Notice also that the aim of the paper is not to study the emergence and/or persistence of work values but
rather to investigate their economic and political implications. See Lindbeck et al. (2006) for an economic analysis
in which parents are norm sender and instill in their children work norms which are sustained by guilt. See also
Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (2003) and Bisin and Verdier (2004) and for recents studies of the persistence and
evolution of work ethics and the welfare state.
9The comparison of the US versus EU social contracts has generated a signicant amount of literature (some of
which is discussed below). We refer the interested reader to the extensive analysis in Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
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explain the di¤erences as resulting from the existence of multiple equilibria. Generally, the
explanations have focused on real or perceived di¤erences in income mobility, on the relative
role of luck versus e¤ort in determining future income or the role of capital market imperfec-
tions. Bénabou (2000) show that capital market imperfections and inequality (in an economy
with di¤erential political power) may lead to multiple equilibria.10 Hassler, Rodriguez Mora,
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) characterize multiple equilibria in a dynamic voting model in
which individuals expectations about redistribution and investment in education support each
other in equilibrium. The role of beliefs on the role of luck and e¤ort for income production was
investigated in Piketty (1995), who show that they can be self-fullling and Alesina and An-
geletos (2005) who, considering individuals with preferences for fairness, show that voting over
taxes may lead to multiple equilibria. Bénabou and Tirole (2005) explore the cognitive hypoth-
esis that individuals may censor evidence on social mobility that conicts with their perception
of reality and study the implications for redistributive politics. The emerging overly optimistic
beliefs tend to moderate support for redistribution.11 Our contribution is complementary to this
strand of literature and it does not rely on real or perceived di¤erences in mobility, asymmetric
information or imperfections in capital markets. In our case the di¤erent types of equilibria
are associated with di¤erent endogenously determined attitudes toward others and oneself. The
ultimate determinant of which type of equilibrium will prevail is the degree of pre-tax inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model, introduce the determi-
nation of sentiments and characterizes optimal labour supply. Section 3 examines the emergence
of socioeconomic equilibria conditional on the degree of inequality and redistribution. Section
4 studies preferences over redistribution and characterizes the politico-economic equilibria in
which taxes, sentiments and labour supply are simultaneously determined. In Section 5 we
specify functional forms which allow us to analytically characterize the di¤erent equilibria and
to study in detail the relationship between inequality, social cohesion and redistribution. Section
6 discusses the testable implications of the model and contrasts them with the available evidence
for a set of OECD countries. Finally, Section 7 discusses the role of the assumptions and the
robustness of the results. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Set up
There are two commodities, consumption c and labour L, and a continuum of agents on [0; 1]. In-
dividuals are of one of two types, skilled or unskilled, distinguished by their productivities/wage,
s and u, respectively, where u < s. Average productivity is denoted . Let  denote the
proportion of individuals of type s. We assume  < 12 , reecting the fact that a majority of
agents are unskilled. The amount of e¤ective labour supplied by an individual with productivity
i is iLi, for i = u; s. We assume output depends linearly on e¤ective labour so that
Y = (1  )uLu + sLs. (1)
Labour income is subject to a purely redistributive linear income tax described by the pair
( ; T ), where  2 [0; 1] is the constant marginal tax rate and T is a budget balancing uniform
10See Bénabou (1996) for an excellent and comprehensive survey of the literature on the di¤erent channels
through which capital market imperfections create ine¢ ciencies in unequal societies.
11Bénabou and Ok (2001) present a model in which the (egoistic) poor face upward mobility prospects; they
characterize conditions under which the poor would rationally vote for a moderate level of redistribution. Corneo
and Grüner (2000) and Grüner and Schils (2006) also have investigated the existence of (social) limits to the
demand for redistribution.
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per capita transfer. That is,
T () =  [(1  )yu + ys]  y, (2)
where yi = iLi is the pre-tax income of individual i and y is average income. Hence, individual
after-tax disposable income is
ydi = (1  )yi + T = (1  )iLi + T , (3)
which we assume is entirely consumed.
The overall welfare evaluation of an individual of type i, which we denote Vi, is composed
of the sum of two components, private utility, vi, and social utility, wi. The latter captures the
e¤ect of is relative empathy or concern for others on its well-being and is explained in detail
below. Hence, we have
Vi = vi + wi. (4)
Private utility. Focusing rst on vi, we assume, as in Lindbeck et al. (1999), that private
utility depends on consumption, ci, and leisure, li 2 [0; L] (Li = L   li), as well as on the
parameter 'i measuring self-worth or self-esteem. Thus, we write
vi = v(ci; li; 'i). (5)
We assume v is strictly increasing and concave, that consumption and leisure are both normal
goods, and that vcl > 0. We also assume initially that v satises the standard Inada conditions.12
In the sequel, the parameter 'i will be determined endogenously through social interaction, but
for now we take it as given. We denote ' ('u; 's).13
Social utility. Turning to the social or altruistic component of (4), we assume wi consists
of a weighted sum of the private utilities of the other agents. Let i;j  0 denote the relative
esteem or concern felt by an individual of type i towards one of type j. We denote the vector of
agent is weights by i(i;u; i;s) and the full array of weights by (u;s).
The social component of overall utility is thus given by
wi = (1  )i;uvu + i;svs = (6)
= i [(1  i)vu + ivs]  i ewi,
where i is individual is (average) social concern
i  (1  )i;u + i;s (7)
with i 2 [0; 1], and
i  i;s
i
(8)
is the share of is social concern allocated to the group of type s agents.14
Using this notation, we can write individual total utility as,
Vi = vi + i ewi: (9)
12We assume the Inada conditions ( lim
c!0
vc = 1; lim
c!1
vc = 0; lim
l!0
vl = 1, and lim
l!L
vl = 0) are satised in order
simplify the exposition by insuring interior solutions. In fact in the second part of the paper we illustrate the
working of the model by restricting attention to a quasi-linear specication of the utility function.
13Since agents di¤er only in their productivities, all agents of the same type will behave in the same fashion in
equilibrium. Hence, in our behaviour-based theory of endogenous sentiments, we assume all such agents have the
same self-esteem and esteem for others.
14Thus we exclude malevolence and we assume no agent cares more about others than it does about itself. The
former is for expositional convenience. Our results only require that sentiments be bounded below. We normalize
the support of individual altruism to [0; 1] for tractability. The qualitative results are unchanged for arbitrary
upper and lower bounds  and , respectively, [  0;  <1].
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2.2 Moral Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Behaviour
The role of moral values is a central topic in Social Psychology. Rokeach (1973) denes values as
general and enduring standards that help us to "evaluate and judge, to heap praise and x blame
on ourselves and others" (p. 13). Values can be associated to, and sustained by, both social
and moral enforcement mechanisms. While social norms and values are conventions that are
imposed on us from the outside, moral norms are "injunctive" and result from an inner pressure
to behave in a particular way.15 In this paper we focus on moral values only, specically moral
values concerning work: "work values". As Lukes (1973) notes work values are crucial in western
culture which "celebrates the virtues of hard work and sacrice. It equates idleness with sin".
Behaving or not accordingly with our moral standard has an e¤ect on self-esteem and on the
esteem we assign to others (see e.g. Crocker and Park (2003)). The impact on self-evaluation
derives from the emotions of guilt and pride we feel as we fall short or go beyond what our moral
norms dictate as proper behavior. According to Tangney (2002), in the Handbook of Self and
Identity, shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride serve an important self-regulatory function by
providing critical feedback to the self about the selfs thoughts, intentions and behavior. In the
face of triumph, transgression, or error, the self turns towards the selfevaluating and rendering
judgement in reference to moral standards. (...) When we violate important standards, we are
inclined to experience negative self-conscious emotions, such as shame, guilt, and embarrassment.
When we meet or exceed standards, we are inclined to experience pride and attendant increases
in self-esteem. In this way, shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride function as an emotional
barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability and
our worth as human beings(pp. 384-5).16
Guilt and pride decrease or increase our self-worth (see e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
Guilt and the corresponding change in self-esteemhas two types of consequences. On the
one hand, "guilt typically leads to a reparative action."(p. 388). On the other hand, "guilt
experiences...convey greater empathy for others (...) guilt and empathy go hand in hand. (...)
Empirical research has shown that empathy motivates altruistic, helping behavior."(pp. 388-
9).17
Our modeling of the role of moral values follows this socio-psychological literature. De-
viations from the moral standards produce guilt and pride, thus modifying our self-esteem.
Likewise, observed deviations by others modify the worth we assign to the individual concerned.
The sense of guilt and the fall in self-esteem has two consequences: the guilty person undertakes
reparative actions and at the same time increases the empathy the esteemhe feels for the oth-
ers. How this empathy is allocated among the others also depends on the moral judgement on
their observed behavior. We attach high (low) worth to those with positive (negative) deviations
from the moral standard.
In particular, we specify work values into a work norm: average labor supply (L). Working
below average is considered laziness and produces guilt and negative valuations and working
above produces pride and appreciation. Therefore the consequences of guilt and pride are: (i)
[Allocation of social empathy] we assign a low share of social esteem (the  coe¢ cient) to those
we consider lazy (i.e. that fail to meet the moral standard) and a high share to the industrious
15See Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991) p. 203. The terminology, however, varies with authors. Schwartz
(1977) and Schwartz and Howard (1982), for instance, use the term "personal norms" for the norms based on
internalized moral values which do not require external social sanction.
16See also Lamont (2000) for an extensive analysis documenting the importance of hard work as fundamental
source of self-worth for manual workers in US and France.
17A large and established experimental evidence documents the self-regulative role of guilt and pride. For
example, in experimental settings participants that experience guilt are much more likely to comply to moral
standards. See e.g. Freedman et al. (1967), an Tangney (1995, 2002). Also, guilt and the associated changes
in self-esteem, consistently relates with measures of altruism and social concern. See e.g. Eisenberg (1986),
Baumeister et al (1994) and references therein.
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(i.e. those that exceed the moral standard) ; and with respect the self, (ii) [Self-esteem and social
empathy] working below (above) average labor supply will decrease (increase) self-esteem (the
'i parameter) and will increase (decrease) the empathy/social consideration for the others (i);
and nally, (iii) [Regulatory function of moral values] the decrease (increase) in self-esteem (')
induces a reparatory action and hence an increase (decrease) in labor supply, that is, a decrease
(increase) in the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure. This e¤ect of guilt on
labor supply captures the self-regulatory role of self-conscious emotions.
Formally we specify the previous points as follows:18
(i) [Allocation of social empathy] The share of social empathy i relative to the population
share  is equal the labor supply of this group relative to the average:19
i (t)

=
Ls (t  1)
L (t  1) . (10)
Notice that by (8), the adjustment in  is related to past performance by
i;s(t)
i(t)
=
Ls (t  1)
L (t  1) (11)
which implies
Lj (t  1) ? Li (t  1), i;j (t) ? i;i (t) . (12)
so that an individual of type j is a¤orded more esteem than someone of type i if and only if js
labour supply exceeds is.
(ii) [Self-esteem and social empathy] Self-worth changes depending on ones own behavior
relative to the moral standard,
Li (t  1) ? L (t  1) =) 'i(t) ? 'i (t  1) . (13)
and a drop (increase) in self-worth produced by a feeling of guilt (pride) increases (decreases)
the empathy for the others (i), that is,
'i (t) = g (i (t)) , (14)
for some strictly decreasing function g. Since  2 [0; 1] we denote ' = g (1)  0 and ' = g (0) <
1.20
(iii) [Regulatory function of moral values] The repository action induced by guilt makes
individuals to supply more labor the opposite with pride and hence the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure satises
d
d'i

vl
vc

> 0. (15)
Note that the sentiments of guilt and pride lead to compensatory behavior in labor supply. Pride
induced by industriousness makes individuals consider leisure as well deservedand hence to
a reduction in their labor supply (as shown in the next section).
18 In the following sections we focus on steady state values and thus we will omit the explicit reference to time.
19This rule for allocation of social esteem appears natural since the work norm is dened in terms of relative
labour supply. Notice that it also implies that the share of total esteem apportioned to group s is proportional
to that groups relative contribution to aggregate e¤ort.
20A deeper investigation of the determinants of prosocial behaviour is outside the goal of this paper. See
Bènabou and Tirole (2006) for a thorough study of this issue. For our purposes it is su¢ cient to consider that
variations in 'i following deviations from moral standards change the relative consideration of the self towards
the others.
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At this point, few comments on the role of moral values for work motivation are in order.
Firstly, the assumed ethical rule does not take personal circumstances into account when passing
judgement on others. While there are instances in which it would be natural to take personal
circumstances into account, we simply take the average work weekas the benchmark. This
seems a natural starting point when modeling attitudes in large societies.21 Secondly, moral
work values is but one of the relevant psychological factors which inuence work e¤ort. A large
body of research in social psychology has documented a number of determinants of individual
work motivation.22 Here we concentrate our attention exclusively to moral values and moral
emotions. Finally notice that, following Rosemberg (1965), psychologists treat self-evaluation
as multidimensional comprising notions of perceived worth both in relation with values and
standards and in relation with competence in task performance. In particular, the literature
distinguishes between self perception in relation with self-conscious emotions (self-esteem in
relation to e.g. feelings of guilt and pride) and beliefs ("self-condence" in relation to e.g.
beliefs of being competent/incompetent). Here we restrict attention to "self-esteem" in relation
to self-regulatory emotions and not "self-condence" in relation to self-relevant beliefs.23
2.3 Labour Supply
Ultimately, the choice variables in our model are labour supply, Li, and the voting decision or
preferred marginal tax rate,  i. (T will be determined by (2) and sentiments will be determined
endogenously as a result of evolution of the labour supply decisions.) In this section, however,
we focus on the labour supply decision only, taking the tax policy (and sentiments) as given.
Since the size of each individual is negligible with respect to the entire economy, their choice of
labour supply cannot have a direct e¤ect on the well-being of other agents. Hence, in determining
individual labour supply, only the private component of utility matters. (The social component
will play a role in voting over taxes.) Thus, individual i chooses its labour supply to maximize
its private utility subject to the budget constraint (3), that is, i solves
max
Li
v
 
ci; L  Li; 'i

(16)
s.t.

ci = (1  )iLi + T
Li  L
Substituting for ci and di¤erentiating v with respect to Li, we obtain
@v
@Li
= vc ((1  )iLi + T; li; 'i) (1  )i   vl ((1  )iLi + T; li; 'i) .
21 In their model of taxpayer resentment as determined by welfare stigma, Besley and Coate (1992) link the
stigma to being a welfare recipient, irrespective of personal characteristics. Also Lindbeck et al (1999) assume that
the psychological cost of living on unemployment benet is not conditional on ones productivity. As discussed
below the consideration of personal circunstances does not a¤ect the qualitative results as long as individual
behaviour is judged in comparison to a social standard.
22Most of these studies concern work inside organizations rather than in society at large. For example Latham
and Pinder (2005) in their recent survey of theories and empirical evidence document, together with values
and self-regulation, also the importance of job characteristics and design, perceived fairness on the job or task
enjoyment. These results are closely related to the literature on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Deci (1971)).
In economics this issue was rst discussed by Kreps (1997) and Frey (1997). Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the
theory and evidence on the role of non economic motivation. See also Falk and Fehr (2002), Gneezy and Rustichini
(2001) and Murdoch (2002).
23Changes self-esteem and self-condence tend to a¤ect behaviour di¤erently. For example while a reduction in
self-condence (e.g. a drop in the perceived probability of success in a task) tend to decrease e¤ort, a reduction in
self-esteem (e.g. associated to a feeling of guilt for not meeting the standard) tend to increase it. Both concepts
have been recently incorporated in economic models. Most prominantly Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2006) study the
role of self-regulatory emotions and moral standards while the cited works by Bènabou and Tirole study the role
of self-condence in environments with uncertainty and asymmetric information.
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Di¤erentiating again, we have
@2v
@L2i
= vcc (:) (1  )2 2i   2vcl (:) (1  )i + vll (:)  D < 0.
Since v is concave and satises the Inada conditions, it follows that the labour supply function
is implicitly dened by the rst order condition @v@Li = 0, or by
vl
 
(1  )iLi + T;L  Li; 'i

vc
 
(1  )iLi + T;L  Li; 'i
 = (1  )i. (17)
Expression (17) implicitly denes the optimal labour supply as a function of the relevant
parameters: net wage, self-esteem and per capita transfer, i.e.,
Li = ((1  )i; 'i; T ). (18)
Here, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour depends on 'i,
thereby a¤ecting the labour supply decision. Totally di¤erentiating with respect to Li and i
in (17), we obtain
dLi
di
=   1
D
(1  ) fvcc(:) (1  )iLi + vc(:)  vcl(:)Lig , (19)
where  1=D > 0. Let us denote by "vc;L the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption
with respect to labour, that is,
"vc;L = [vcc(:) (1  )i   vcl(:)]Li=vc(:).
Then (19) can be written as
dLi
di
=   1
D
(1  )("vc;L + 1)vc(:). (20)
Making the assumption that j"vc;Lj < 1 insures that dLidi > 0, or that labour supply increases
with the wage.
Next, let us examine the e¤ect a change of self-esteem on labour supply. Di¤erentiating (17),
we obtain
dLi
d'i
=   1
D
[vc'(:) (1  )i   vl'(:)]. (21)
From (15) together with the rst order condition (17) we have24
dLi
d'i
< 0. (22)
The labour supply function so obtained,  ((1  )i; 'i; T ), has the property that both
higher economic rewards (net wage) and increased moral pressure (associated with the perception
of being lazy) increase labour e¤ort.
24Di¤erentiating and using the rst order condition for optimal labour supply (17), we can rewrite (15) as
@
@'i

vl
vc

=

1
vc
(vl'   vc' (1  )i)

=
=

vl
vc
'i

vl'
'ivl
  vc'
'ivc

=

vl
vc
'i

("vl;'   "vc;'),
so that (15) is equivalent to assuming the elasticity of the marginal utility of leisure with respect to self-esteem is
larger than the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption: ["vl;'   "vc;'] > 0.
9
3 Socioeconomic Stationary Equilibria
Having explained how labour supply is determined in response to the prevailing sentiments
and how sentiments vary with labour supply, we now analyze the stationary points of this
reciprocal/dynamic process. (We address the determination of the tax policy in the next section.)
That is, for given  , we wish to consider combinations (L;';) such that for each i = u; s, (a)
Li satises (18) at 'i, (b) 'i is invariant at L under the adjustment process (13), (c) 'i and
i are related according to (14), and (d) L and  satisfy (11). Condition (c) says the levels
'i and i are linked according to the reciprocal relation (14), whereas (d) says the distribution
of social empathy is consistent with relative performance. We refer to such a combination as a
socio-economic stationary equilibrium, or SE equilibrium for short.
Notice from the assumed dynamics of sentiments (13) and from (22) that self-esteem provides
a countervailing force to the complete polarization of labour supply; those with low self-worth
face moral pressure to work more, and those with high self-worth have an incentive to work less.
This is similar to the welfare stigma e¤ect in Lindbeck et al. (1999) where individuals face moral
pressure to work and avoid the stigma of welfare, and they receive additional utility when they
accede to this moral principle. Here, since self-esteem changes in response to observed relative
performance, there is a tendency to converge to an endogenous social norm concerning e¤ort
provision. Nevertheless, as we shall see below convergence is not always possible.
There can be two di¤erent types of SE equilibria in which economic behaviour and sentiments
are mutually compatible. In the rst type, everyone conforms to the moral standard and supplies
the average number of work hours. Whatever the matrix  of coe¢ cients necessary to support
such behaviour, no agent will have a reason to modify its sentiments for any other agent or
its self-esteem. Furthermore, since in this case all agents supply the same quantity of labour,
equilibrium sentiments are such that i = , for all i. Hence, there is no bias or discrimination
in the allocation of social empathy; i.e., the share of is social empathy allocated to the type s
agents corresponds precisely to the proportion of type s agents in the population. Because of
this feature and the conformity of behaviour, we call this type of SE equilibrium cohesive.
The second type of equilibrium consists of corner solutions of the dynamic process of socio-
economic interactions. In such an equilibrium the population is partitioned into two groups or
clusters, one set of individuals (type s) work above the mean and another set (type u) work
below. The former have maximum self-esteem (and minimum empathy for others), while the
latter have minimum self-esteem (and maximum social empathy). In addition the social empathy
of every individual will be biased in favor of the industrious. Sentiments become endogenously
polarized: those working below the average will be regarded as lazy even by themselves and
su¤er from both low social consideration and low self-esteem. We call such an SE equilibrium
clustered.
We now characterize the conditions under which either of the two types of SE equilibria
exist.
For given  and  , a cohesive SE equilibrium consists of a vector ' such that it is optimal
for both types to supply the same quantity of labour L. Notice that 'i is constrained to belong
to the interval

';'

. We start by noting that when Li = L for all i, the per capita transfer is
given by T = L.25 Using (18), we can identify the pairs of 'i and i for which both types
would choose to supply L. This is given implicitly as the solution to26
F (i;'i; ; L; )   ((1  )i; 'i; L)  L = 0, for i = u; s. (23)
25Recall  is the average productivity.
26Note that while the following expression contains the consistency requirement T = L, the rst order
condition (17), from which  is obtained, precludes consideration of the e¤ect of ones labour supply on aggregate
transfers. Therefore, the following expression should be viewed as an accounting relationship that is required to
hold at an SE equilibrium rather than as a rst order condition.
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Next, we investigate values of  and  such that there exist L and 'i 2

';'

for which (23)
is satised for both i = u; s.
From (22) we know that for each i, there is a maximum labour supply, denoted by Li( ; i; ),
and a minimum labour supply Li( ; i; ) that are compatible with 'i being in

';'

. These
are given implicitly by
Li =  ((1  )i; '; Li) and Li = 
 
(1  )i; '; Li

: (24)
The next proposition establishes that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence
of a cohesive SE equilibrium is that the intervals

Lu; Lu

and

Ls; Ls

have a non-empty
intersection. Conversely, that the intersection is empty is both necessary and su¢ cient for there
to exist a clustered SE equilibrium.
Proposition 1. For any (; ) the following hold:
i) A cohesive SE equilibrium exists if and only if
Lu( ; u; )  Ls( ; s; ). (25)
In this case there are generally multiple equilibria. That is, for every Lo 2 Ls( ; s; ); Lu( ; u; )
there exist 'u; 's 2

';'

for which (23) is satised at Li = Lo, for i = u; s. In all such equi-
libria i;j = i for i; j = u; s.
ii) A clustered SE equilibrium exists if and only if
Lu( ; u; ) < Ls( ; s; ). (26)
In this case, the equilibrium is unique and is given by:
Lu = 
 
(1  )u; '; T

< Ls =  ((1  )s; '; T )
where T =  ((1  )uLu + sLs)), and by 'u = '; 's = ', i = g 1('i); and i;j = LjL i
for i; j = u; s.
This proposition establishes that one or the other, but not both, of the two types of SE
equilibrium will always exist. For any  it may be possible to observe multiple cohesive equilibria
parametrized by the degree of industriousness and sustained by di¤erent degree of moral pressure
to work while when it exists the clustered equilibrium is unique. Whether the equilibria are
cohesive or clustered depends crucially on both the degree of inequality in  and the level
of redistribution  . If inequality in  is too large, then the moderating e¤ect of self-esteem
on labour supply will be insu¢ cient to overcome the di¤erence, and cohesiveness will not be
sustainable. On the other hand, redistribution equalizes the economic rewards to labour for the
two types of workers and hence changes the relative return of moral and economic rewards to
e¤ort. These issues are investigated in greater detail in the next section where we consider the
endogenous choice of redistributive policy.
Before turning to this, however, we highlight the relative di¤erences of the two types of agents
in any stationary equilibrium. In a clustered SE equilibrium the unskilled are poorer and less
industrious than the skilled despite having lower self-esteem and thus larger moral motivation
to work. Also in any cohesive SE equilibrium in which (23) is satised by both types for the
same L, totally di¤erentiating this expression with respect to i and 'i and using (20) and (22),
we readily obtain that
@'i
@i
> 0.
Hence, in a cohesive equilibrium where all individuals work the same it must be that those who
receive higher (lower) economic rewards feel less (more) moral pressure to work. Therefore,
bearing in mind that altruism i is inversely related to self-esteem, we have the following result.
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Proposition 2. In any stationary SE equilibrium the individuals with higher productivity have
greater self-esteem, lower altruism, and face lower moral motivation to work than those with low
productivity.
4 Endogenous Redistribution
So far we have taken  as given, and we have seen that attitudes and behaviour will di¤er
depending upon the type of socioeconomic equilibrium to emerge. We begin this section by
considering the opposite: what level of redistribution will be chosen by a group of individuals
with given sentiments? We then categorize the e¤ect of taxes in determining the type of SE
equilibrium.
4.1 From Sentiments to Taxes
On the majoritarian choice of income tax schedules we follow the approach developed by Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). In our case, the majority is constituted
by unskilled workers and hence we shall focus on their preferences over taxes. Given their
sentiments, individuals vote over redistribution. When voting, agents are aware of the distortions
caused by income taxation on labour supply and anticipate the existence of a public budget
constraint.27 Therefore, from equation (18), for given 'i, the optimal labour supply is a function
of the tax rate  and of the per capita transfers T : Li (;';  ; T ) for i = u; s. Notice, however,
that the existence of the public budget allows to express the per capita transfer as a function of
the tax rate. From (18) and (2) we have that
T =  [(1  )yu ( ; T ) + ys ( ; T )]  y ( ; T ) (27)
As in MR, for any  the assumed normality of leisure insures that the RHS (right hand side) of
(27) is a strictly decreasing function of T implying that for any  there exists a unique T which
balances the public budget. This allows us to express the per capita transfer and the individual
indirect private utility as a function of  only,
i ()  vi
 
(1  ) yi () + y () ; L  Li (;'; )

,
where yi ()  iLi (;'; ) and y ()  [(1  ) yu () + ys ()].
The degree of redistribution preferred by an unskilled worker, denoted u, maximizes its
indirect total utility (9) subject to the public budget constraint (2), taking into account the
induced change in the optimal labour supplies. Therefore, u is the solution to the following
maximization problem:
u = arg max
2[0;1]
Vu (;';) = arg max
2[0;1]
fu () + u [(1  u)u () + ss ()]g . (28)
Consider, rst, the preferred level of redistribution of an egoistic agent. With no social
empathy, i.e. u = 0, the problem is identical to that in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Its
solution, as given by the following rst order condition, would constitute the majoritarian choice
since the unskilled comprise a majority of the population:28
du ()
d
=
@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d
+ (1  )u
@Lu
@

+
@vu
@Lu
@Lu
@
= 0.
27 In contrast, Kranich (2001) assumes that altruistic agents vote over quadratic taxes and modify their labour
supply iteratively rather than simultaneously.
28 In the remainder of the section we use the abbreviated notation Li for Li (;';), yi for yi () and y for y ()
when no ambiguity will result.
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Using (17), this condition simplies to
du
d
=
@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d

= 0. (29)
Therefore, the preferred tax rate is increasing in inequality (i.e., y   yu). Let us denote by m
the tax rate satisfying the rst order condition for an interior optimum in the egoistic case (29).
When u > 0, however, preferences over redistribution will be a¤ected by both the degree
of social empathy u and by the bias in the allocation of this empathy. The marginal e¤ect on
total utility of a variation in  is given by
dVu ()
d
=
@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d

+ (30)
+u

(1  u)@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d

+ u
@vs
@c

y   ys +  dy
d

.
Notice that
dVu ()
d

=m
< 0
and this implies that when unskilled workers are socially concerned, they will prefer a tax rate
smaller than m. Intuitively, if the poor are altruistic, then they are adversely a¤ected by the
rich having to bear the cost of redistribution. An interior solution for the equilibrium tax rate
u > 0 is characterized by setting (30) equal to zero and verifying that the indirect utility is
locally concave at  = u
d2Vu ()
d2

=u
< 0 (31)
These considerations imply the following,
Proposition 3. If u > 0, then for any given allocation of social empathy across groups , and
any ('; ) such that yu < y, we have that u < m. That is, the majority rule tax rate is smaller
than in the egoistic case. Furthermore for any interior u the equilibrium tax is decreasing in
u.29
4.2 From Taxes to Sentiments
Given current sentiments (';), individuals vote over the tax policy as described in the previous
subsection. But then the new tax policy might induce a change in behaviour, and this, in turn,
might a¤ect agentsself-esteem and relative empathy for others. In this subsection we begin to
investigate the e¤ect of  on the type of stationary sentiments to emerge in equilibrium.
From Proposition 1 we know that for any given level of  a cohesive equilibrium will emerge
only if the unskilled face su¢ cient moral pressure to work (stemming from low self-esteem) to
overcome the adverse incentive e¤ect of taxation. Indeed, if  is too large, this may reduce the
return to labour to such an extent that moral suasion is insu¢ cient even when self-esteem is
minimal.
The intuition behind this result hinges on the normality of leisure which implies that, ceteris
paribus, the incentive to supply labour diminishes as scal transfers become larger and the tax
rate higher. In fact for any given vector ', the negative e¤ect of taxation on labour supply is
29Notice also that the level of redistribution preferred by the skilled is always lower than that preferred by the
unskilled but it is (weakly) larger than the egoistic benchmark and it is (weakly) increasing in s. Hence while
the rich oppose any taxation in the egoistic benchmark, they may support redistribution in this setting. A formal
proof is provided in the appendix.
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stronger for unskilled workers. The logic of the argument is as follows. Consider again (23), which
identies the quantities of labour compatible with a cohesive equilibrium: F (i;'i; ; L; ) 
 ((1  )i; 'i; L)   L = 0 for i = u; s. An increase in  has two e¤ects. In the rst place
it reduces the net wage of both types leading to a lower labour supply. In the second place
because of the change in the lump-sum transfer, for any given cohesive labour supply L, the
consumption of the unskilled increases. In fact in a cohesive equilibrium the consumption of
agent i is given by ci = [(1  )i + ]L = [i + (   i)]L. Hence, an individual would
consume more than its pre-tax earnings if and only if its productivity is below the mean. The
MRS between consumption and leisure increases and hence labour supply is reduced. For the
unskilled workers, the two e¤ects go in the same direction and this implies that the labour supply
by the unskilled denitively decreases. For any L, consumption decreases with  for the skilled
workers and this tends to increase labour supply. The two e¤ects go in opposite directions so
that the net result is ambiguous.
This di¤erential e¤ect of redistribution on the labour supply of the di¤erent types of agents
implies that if redistribution is too large, then the economic incentives to the unskilled may
be too weak. Under these conditions the moral incentives are insu¢ cient to sustain a cohesive
equilibrium.
At this level of generality it is not possible to explicitly characterize the link between redis-
tribution and social cohesion. In order to further investigate the relationship between taxation
and sentiments, we now restrict attention to the family of preferences given by
v(c; l; ') =
c1 
1   + 'f(L  L) (32)
with   0 , f 0 (:) > 0 and f 00 (:)  0.
As we shall see, the e¤ect of redistribution on sentiments will critically depend on the relative
productivity of the two types of workers, which we denote by e  u=s 2 [0; 1]. In line with the
previous discussion on the di¤erential role of redistribution on moral and economic incentives
we have the following,
Proposition 4. For any e, there exists a unique threshold level of redistribution (e) 2 [0; 1]
such that for any   (e) only cohesive SE equilibria exist, while for any  > (e) only
clustered SE equilibria exist.30 Furthermore the larger the gap in productivities the lower the
level of maximum redistribution: @(e)=@e > 0.
According to this proposition, the choice of  will lead to a cohesive (clustered) equilibrium
if  is su¢ ciently small (large). Moreover, the critical level, (e), depends on the productivity
ratio. If e is su¢ ciently large or su¢ ciently small, then the choice of  will have no inuence
on the type of equilibrium. In the former case, the di¤erence in wages is small enough so that
the economy always settles in a cohesive equilibrium, while in the latter, it settles in a clustered
equilibrium. We state this result in the following.
Proposition 5. There exist two thresholds of relative skills, e0 and e1, 0  e0  e1 < 1,
such that for any given  there is  () 2
he0; e1i such that for any e >  () only cohesive SE
equilibria exists while for any e <  () only clustered SE equilibria exist with @ () =@ > 0.
If e is outside the thresholds the type of equilibrium does not depend on the tax rate. For
intermediate levels of inequality the type of equilibrium crucially depends on redistribution: low
taxation produces cohesive equilibria and high taxation clustered equilibria.
30As discussed in detail below, 
e is not necessarily interior. Therefore, under some circumstances it may
be the case that only cohesive or only clustered equilibria can be observed for all  2 [0; 1].
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5 Politico-Economic Equilibria
In the last section we studied how sentiments a¤ect the choice of taxes and how the level of
redistribution leads to di¤erent equilibrium sentiments. We now focus on the full politico-
economic equilibrium of the model (henceforth PE equilibrium) in which sentiments, labour
supplies and taxes are each variable and all are required to be mutually compatible. Thus, a PE
equilibrium is characterized by a vector (L;';; ) such that (L;';) is an SE equilibrium at
the tax rate  , and  solves (28).
5.1 Existence and Uniqueness
In order to study the implications of social cohesion more precisely, we now characterize the equi-
libria for a restricted class of economies which permit an explicit analytical solution. Specically,
we consider the following specic forms of (32) and (14)31
v(ci; Li; 'i) = ci +

1  L
2
i
2

'i, (33)
and
'i =
1
1 + i
. (34)
In this case, the labour supply is given by,
Li (i; 'i; ) = (1  )i
1
'i
= (1  )i(1 + i). (35)
As an index of inequality, we use the relative gap between mean and median income,
I  y   yu
y
. (36)
Notice that in this case I is proportional to the Gini index, which is given by G = (1  ) I.
We now dene eyu as the moral perception of mean income by the unskilled:
eyu  [(1  u)yu + uys] (37)
According to eyu, the unskilled weight the two incomes by the moral weights u and (1 u)
rather than by the population weights  and (1  ). This reects the fact that the former may
be biased in assigning greater weight to one group than their population proportion warrants.
We take a measure of such bias to be
  (y   eyu)
y
: (38)
Hence,  is the relative di¤erence between the true mean and the moral perception of mean
income. Notice that in a cohesive equilibrium u = , and hence  = 0. In a clustered equilibrium
us empathy is biased in favor of high productivity individuals, so u >  and we have y < eyu
and hence  < 0. Here, because of the linearity of the labour supply functions (35) we have32
 =   (1  ) 1  2
e
 + (1  ) 2e 1  2e
2
 + (1  ) 2e2 . (39)
31The linear-quadratic formulation of utility has often been adopted in the literature. See, for example, Piketty
(1995) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005)).
32From the denition we have
 =
(u   )
 
22u   2s

(1  ) 22u + 2s
,
where u = s= [(1  ) 2u + s]. Substituting and manipulating, we obtain the expression in the text.
15
It follows that in a clustered PE equilibrium the bias  depends on exogenous parameters
only and is independent of  .
The indirect private utility of an individual of type i is given by
v( ; T; i; 'i) =
(1  )2 2i
2'i
+ T () + 'i. (40)
Using (35), we obtain the following expressions for the e¤ects of  on labour, gross earnings
and transfers, respectively:
dLi
d
=   Li
1   ,
dyi
d
=   yi
1   and
dT
d
=
1  2
1   y. (41)
Di¤erentiating the egoistic (indirect) utility vi (40) with respect to  , we obtain
dvi
d
= y   yi   
1   y. (42)
Then di¤erentiating the total indirect utility (9) with respect to  , we get the rst order
condition
dVu
d
= (1 + u)
1  2
1   y   yu   ueyu = 0. (43)
Let us assume for the moment that the rst order condition for redistribution identies a max-
imum. Solving (43) and using the denitions of I and , we obtain the unique preferred tax by
an unskilled individual,
u =
I + u 
1 + u + I + u
.
Let us now turn to the conditions for an interior optimum. Using the labour supply functions
(35) in (9), one can show that the indirect total utility is a quadratic function of  .33 Furthermore
Vu(0) > Vu(1). Therefore, @Vu (0) =@ > 0 is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a
unique interior optimum. In the following proposition we identify the condition under which
this inequality holds.
Proposition 6. For any (;; ) the tax rate u preferred by an unskilled individual is given
by34
u =
I + u 
1 + u + I + u
, if  >
u
1 + u
u, (44)
and u = 0 otherwise.
33Using (35) we can express the indirect utility of individual i as
Vi() = 'i + i [(1  u)'u + u's] +
(1  )2
2

2i
1
'i
+ i

(1  u)2u
1
'u
+ u
2
s
1
's

+(1  )  (1 + i)

(1  )2u
1
'u
+ 2s
1
's

:
34Di¤erentiating and evaluating at  = 0, we have the condition
V 0u (0) =

2s
's
  
2
u
'u

(u (   u) + )
Using the labour supply functions (35), we have that

2s
's
  2u
'u

> 0 in any stationary equilibrium.
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Inspection of (44) reveals that, ceteris paribus, the chosen tax is increasing in I and in .
As mentioned earlier, if u = 0, then the problem becomes identical to MR and the demand
for redistribution is increasing with inequality I. Relative to this benchmark, when u > 0
preferences over redistribution will be a¤ected by the degree of social empathy and by the bias
in the allocation of this empathy as captured by . Poor altruistic individuals will weigh the cost
of taxation to the rich against the benets of redistribution towards the poor. As a result, as
in Proposition 2, their redistributive demands may be more moderate than under pure egoism.
As for the role of the bias in individual sentiments, the direction in which u diverges from the
benchmark case is determined by the sign of , i.e. it depends on whether the unskilled have a
pro-poor or pro-rich bias.
We now characterize the PE equilibria. We begin by restating the conditions of Proposition
5. Due to the linearity of the labour supply function (35) the thresholds e0 and e1 coincide. To
see this, note that according to (35), the extreme values of Lu () and Ls () are
Lu () = 2 (1  )u
Ls () = (1  )s.
Hence, an economy is in a cohesive PE equilibrium, i.e., Lu ()  Ls (), if and only if
s 
L
(1  )  2u. (45)
Expression (45) gives the pairs ( ; L) that are consistent with a cohesive PE equilibrium.
From Proposition 5 and using (45) we have that the economy will be in a cohesive (respectively
clustered) equilibrium if and only if e  (<) 1
2
. (46)
The implication of this is that, given e, the economy will be in either type of equilibrium
independently of the tax  . Therefore, we can examine the characterization of the politico-
economic equilibrium separately in the two ranges e ? 1=2.
Also because of the linearity of the labour supply function (35), I is independent of  .
Substituting into (36), we obtain
I =


1  e
 + (1  ) e if e  12 and Io =


1  2e2
 + (1  ) 2e2 if e < 12 . (47)
Therefore, in spite of the potential multiplicity of cohesive PE equilibria, all will be character-
ized by the same degree of income inequality, which depends only on the exogenous parameterse and .
In order to compare income inequality across the two types of equilibria, consider economy
A with eA which is clustered (eA < 12) and economy B with eB which is cohesive (eB  12).
Observe that Io in (47) is strictly decreasing in e. Also, note that eA < 1=2 < eB implies
2e2A < 1=2 < eB. Finally, we also have that
I (1=2) = Io (1=2) = I  
1 + 
. (48)
Taken together, these observations establish the following:
Lemma 1. The degree of income inequality in a clustered (cohesive) economy is always larger
(smaller) than I.
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Next, we characterize the features of both cohesive and clustered equilibria. We begin with
the former.
As established above, a cohesive equilibrium can exist only if the ratio L(1 ) lies within the
xed bounds given by (45). However, there is nothing to preclude the preferred tax, u , from
violating this condition for each L. Consider any distribution of social concerns compatible with
a cohesive equilibrium. Since all groups contribute to total labour supply in proportion of their
size, individual esteem is unbiased and  = 0. Substituting into (44), the preferred tax is:
 =
I
1 + u + I
. (49)
The values of u are bounded above by 1 and below by ^u (I) corresponding to the mini-
mum level of altruism by the unskilled workers compatible with any cohesive equilibrium (this
corresponds to the case in which the skilled workers are fully egoistic). From (35) and (45) we
nd that
^u (I)  1 
ee = I

(1  I) . (50)
As shown in Proposition 3, redistribution is decreasing with u, while labour supply is
increasing in u. As a result there can be a continuum of values of u for which a cohesive PE
equilibrium exist. Therefore, we obtain the following:
Proposition 7. For any (;) such that I  I, every cohesive SE equilibrium with a tax rate
 2

I
2 + I
;
I
K + I

, (51)
where K  I+(1 I)(1 I) < 2, is a PE equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Di¤erent equilibria di¤er in the level of equilibrium
e¤ort and in the degree of redistribution. We depict the combinations of L and  compatible
with the bounds (45) in Figure 1.
Figure 1 About Here
Notice that the area between lines Lu and Ls represents cohesive SE equilibria for any
given value of  . Alternatively, the locus TT contains the vectors ( ; L) for which individual
labour supply and the chosen level of redistribution are mutually compatible.35 Therefore, the
cohesive PE equilibria correspond to the intersection of the TT locus with the set of cohesive
SE equilibria. The maximum labour supply and minimum u are associated with u = 1, while
minimum labour supply and maximum u are associated with ^u (I). It is immediate that in
any cohesive PE equilibrium the higher the tax, the lower is the labour supply and output.
Notice that the multiplicity of cohesive equilibria (i.e., the size of the intersection) shrinks
as I gets larger, and in the limit, where I = I, the cohesive equilibrium is unique since
limI!I ^u (I) = 1.
Turning now to clustered equilibria, we know from Proposition 5, (47) and (39), that for
such equilibria income inequality is Io > I, and, moreover, that both Io and the bias o are
independent of the tax rate. Therefore, given e and , there will be a unique level of  in a PE
equilibrium.
35The analytical computation of the locus TT is included in the Appendix.
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Proposition 8. For any (;) such that Io  I, there exists a threshold Ic 2
 
I; 1

such that
the unique clustered PE equilibrium tax is given by
 o =
n
Io+o
2+Io+o if I 2

I; Ic

, (52)
where Io is given in (47) and o in (39), while  o = 0 if I 2 (Ic; 1].
That there is such a threshold above which  o = 0 derives from the condition for a corner
solution for u , as stated in Proposition 6. For clustered equilibria, this condition can be
rewritten as u  2, which at the equilibrium value of u (from (10)) is equivalent to e 
(1  2) =4 (1  ). Using this information, one can obtain the unique threshold level of Ic from
(47).
5.2 Inequality, Social Cohesion and Redistribution
We now investigate the relationship between income inequality and equilibrium redistribution.
In the previous subsection we saw that for low levels of inequality there is generally a con-
tinuum of cohesive PE equilibria corresponding to the range of  in (51). But for all such
equilibria, inequality is given by I in (47), and I depends only on the exogenous parameters
 and ~. Notice also that the upper bound on  depends on  as well as on I.
For high levels of inequality the economy has a unique clustered PE equilibrium, with the
corresponding degree of inequality given by Io in (47). In this case, too, the clustered PE
equilibrium tax  o depends via o on  and ~, as well as on Io. In the following exercise, we
hold  constant and classify di¤erent economies/levels of inequality by variations in ~.
As a preliminary result notice that while in cohesive equilibria  = 0, in clustered equilibria
the bias towards the more industrious workers, i.e. the degree of social clustering, is increasing
with inequality. We state this formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For I  I;  = 0, and for I > I,  < 0 with @=@I < 0.
This observation has important implications for the relationship between income inequality
and equilibrium redistribution.
The following proposition establishes the relationship between inequality and equilibrium
redistribution in both cohesive and clustered economies.
Proposition 9. (i) For any I  I; both minimum and maximum redistribution among cohesive
PE equilibria, m =
I
2+I and 

M =
I
K+I , are increasing in inequality.
(ii) For any I  I the clustered PE equilibrium  o is a nonmonotonic function of inequality:
there exists a level of inequality Is > I at which  o is maximal. Furthermore for any I  Ic > I;
 o = 0.
Figure 2 illustrates these ndings.
Figure 2 About Here
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Consider rst the case of a cohesive society.
Individual utility combines an egoistic component and a social component. As in the standard
non-altruistic utility benchmark, the egoistic component would lead to an increase in taxation
in response to higher inequality. As for the social component, it would mimic the choice of
taxation by a utilitarian social planner. Hence, when we take the two components together, an
increase in inequality would unambiguously lead to an increase in taxation.
In clustered economies, the highly skilled individuals work above average and, as a result,
social sentiments are biased in their favor. This bias tends to reduce the demand for taxation by
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the poor. The strength of the bias in social sentiments depends on the level of inequality. From
Lemma 2, the higher the inequality, the stronger the bias towards the rich and the lower the
demand for redistribution stemming from the social component of utility. In this case, the ego-
istic and the social component of the utility work in opposite directions. For values of inequality
slightly above I the degree of social clustering and the associated bias in sentiments are small.36
Under these conditions an increase in inequality leads to an increase in redistribution. However,
for a su¢ ciently high degree of inequality, the increase in social clustering and the associated
bias eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation, and the tax preferred by the
unskilled decreases. In fact there always exists a su¢ ciently high level of inequality such that
 o = 0.
Summarizing, among cohesive economies, higher inequality is always associated with higher
taxation. But as inequality increases beyond the threshold and the economy becomes clus-
tered eventually the equilibrium tax rate declines. Hence, our model predicts a nonmonotonic
relationship between inequality and redistribution.37
6 Discussion
We have developed a model in which individual labour supply, attitudes toward others as well
as toward oneself, and the choice of taxation are determined endogenously. Given individual
preferences for consumption and leisure, the degree of pre-tax (factor) income inequality is a
key determinant of the type of equilibrium that prevails in a given economy. In a cohesive
equilibrium all individuals conform to the ethical work norm and supply the same amount of
labour with the moral pressure to work decreasing with the skill level. Furthermore, their
concern for others is not biased toward either group. In this case, the level of taxation increases
with inequality. But such an equilibrium can emerge only if pre-tax inequality is not too large.
If inequality is high, the economy settles into an equilibrium with social clustering in which the
more productive individuals work more than the less productive and no social norm emerges. In
these equilibria the highly productive have maximum self-esteem and minimum relative esteem
for others, while the low productivity types have minimum self-esteem and maximal esteem for
the skilled workers. High inequality leads to a large bias in social concern thereby inducing the
poor to choose low redistribution. In sum, the model brings into a common framework a rich set
of seemingly unrelated predictions concerning behaviour in the labour market, moral attitudes
and preferences for redistribution.
Next we discuss the predictions of the model in line with available cross-country evidence.
To this e¤ect, we shall use data from a set of OECD countries to illustrate how the predictions
of the model concerning the two types of equilibria t empirical evidence. We shall see that the
information available is consistent with the hypothesis that the US and less neatly the UK 
are more clustered societies than continental European countries such as Germany, France or the
Netherlands. The contrast between the US and the EU economies has become an important topic
of research. Most of the discussion has focused on the di¤erences in the degree of redistribution
or more generally the di¤erences in the two kinds of welfare states and in the working of the
labour market. To these we shall add di¤erences in attitudes toward work and toward the poor.
Inequality and Redistribution. One of the most marked di¤erences between the US
and the (continental) EU is the extent of redistribution. The share of welfare transfers over
36 In fact, as anticipated above, as long as social clustering is small enough, clustered and cohesive equilibria
are similar in terms of equilibrium redistribution.
37Notice that for illustrative convenience we expressed the relationship between redistribution and the inequality
index I. Since the Gini index is given by G = (1  ) I the non monotonic relationship emerging in Proposition
9 holds also once expressed in terms of Gini coe¢ cients as proved in the appendix.
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GDP in 2000 was 11 percent in the US and 18 percent in Europe, and the share of total
government spending for the same year (excluding interest payments) was 30 percent and 45
percent, respectively. On this point, we refer the interested reader to the comprehensive analysis
of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001). These di¤erences in
the extent of redistribution are coupled with signicantly higher income inequality in the US
than in EU countries. Concerning pre-tax earnings inequality, Katz and Autor (1999) report
that the log of the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile earner in 1994 was 1.45 in
the US and 0.81 in Germany, for instance. Furthermore, several authors nd that the dispersion
in earnings and wages has increased over the 70s to the 90s.38 This trend toward increased
polarization in earnings and wages has led some sociologists and economists to argue that in the
US the middle class is disappearing.39 The second dimension of inequality relevant to the model
is the distribution of skills. Several authors, see e.g. Katz and Autor (1999) work of Devroye
and Freeman (2001) addresses the problem of denition and measurement of skills using the
OECDs International Adult Literacy Survey to assess the cognitive skills of the respondents.
They document a much larger variation in the US, UK and Canada than in continental Europe.40
According to Acemoglu (2003), high school graduates in the US enjoy a skill premium that is
about 50% larger than in Europe. According to Proposition 9, this negative relationship between
pre-tax income inequality and the level of redistribution suggests that the US must be more
clustered than the EU countries.
To investigate the relationship between inequality and redistribution in more details we use
the data on factor income inequality provided by Milanovic (2000). The notion of factor income
excludes all transfer payments from public sources, most notably pensions. This creates some
di¢ culty when comparing societies with a strong system of public pensions such as in the EU
with the US. Therefore, in order to make the comparison meaningful, we use the calculated
measure of factor income inequality which includes pension transfers (referred to as factor-P
income).41
In order to interpret the data it is useful to note that for linear income taxes the (constant)
marginal tax rate is equal to the ratio of the di¤erence between the Ginis of the pre-tax and after-
tax incomes over the Gini of the pre-tax income. Therefore, by relating the percentage variation
and the level of factor income inequality, we can study the relationship between inequality and
redistribution. Figure 3 plots the data for the percentage change in inequality from factor-P
income to disposable income and the Gini for the factor-P incomes for a number of OECD
countries. The percentage change in factor income provides a measure of income redistribution
(and with linear progressive taxes is also a measure of the marginal tax rate ).
Figure 3 About Here
The least unequal countries are Luxemburg, Norway and Germany with Ginis around 0.36
and the associated tax rate ranging from 0.15 to 0.25. Next, we have Sweden and Belgium both
with a Gini of 0.38 and the same tax rate of 0.31, followed by Finland and Denmark with higher
inequality and redistribution. For higher degrees of inequality, countries redistribute less and
less. For example, Canada and the Netherlands, with Ginis of 0.41, both tax at the rate 0.21.
France with a Gini of 0.43 has a tax rate of 0.19 and the US has a Gini of 0.46 and taxes at
38See Katz and Autor (1999), Devroye and Freeman (2001) and Autor et al. (2006) among others.
39See, for instance, Kosters and Ross (1988) and Horrigan and Haugen (1988) and Duncan, Smeeding, and
Rodgers (1991). Wolfson (1994) and Esteban and Ray (1994) mention this phenomenon as a motivation for the
concept of polarizationof a distribution.
40The mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are respectively: US 283 (60), UK 281 (53), Germany 291
(40) and the Netherlands 295 (40).
41The data correspond to the following years: Australia 1994, Belgium 1992, Canada 1994, Denmark 1992,
Finland 1995, France 1989, West Germany 1989, Italy 1991, Luxemburg 1994, The Netherlands 1991, Norway
1991, Spain 1990, Sweden 1992, UK 1991, US 1991.
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the rate 0.14. In line with Proposition 9, the data display a nonmonotonic relationship between
inequality and redistribution.
Inequality and the Labour Market. The second neat empirical implication of our model
is that for low levels of inequality we should observe (little or) no dispersion in the distribution
of labour supply, but after reaching the critical level for clustering to occur, further increases in
inequality should be associated with increased dispersion in labour supply. In order to contrast
this prediction with available evidence we again use the data on inequality in factor-P income
together with the information supplied by the OECD on working hours.42. By computing the
fraction of the population at the mode of the distribution we have a simple indicator of the
degree of compliance with the work norm, taken here to be the modal number of hours.43
Figure 4 About Here
In this case, the outlying country is Norway. If we focus on the rest, we observe that up to
the degree of inequality 0.41, the di¤erent countries are situated around 70 percent compliance
with the work norm. This set of countries includes Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden, Belgium,
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. France and Canada, with similar levels of inequality,
have degrees of compliance of 55 and 42 percent, respectively. The US and Australia, with
signicantly more inequality, have compliance rates of 35 and 18 percent, respectively. Finally,
the UK distribution has basically no mode.44
One could argue that it is to be expected that higher factor income inequality would be
accompanied by higher dispersion in hours worked. However, it is remarkable that, in line with
the theoretical predictions of our model, until inequality reaches a threshold level (around Gini
= 0.41) the degree of compliance shows basically no trend. It is after that point that additional
inequality materializes in signicant drops in the degree of compliance with the reference norm.
Thus, using our model, we could infer that the rst set of countries are cohesive while the second
set are increasingly clustered.
A second possible reservation is that the labour market in continental Europe is heavily
regulated and that this can explain the strong concentration around the regulated duration
of the work week. However, as pointed out by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) labour
market regulations are most likely endogenous because unions tend to implement regulations in
line with the preferences of the workers they represent. According to this argument, we should
interpret these regulations as a coordination device rather than as a binding constraint on a
signicant part of the labour force. In this regard, the ndings of Bell and Freeman (2001) on
workerspreferences show that (continental) European workers would like to work less rather
than more. In contrast, a larger fraction of US workers express preferences for working more
even if their market is subject to fewer regulations. This suggests that the observed di¤erences in
the degrees of compliance result from di¤erent work norms rather than undesired labour market
regulations.45
42Employment Outlook (Chapter 5, p. 168) based on the European Union labour Force Survey (Eurostat)
and the Current Population Survey for the US on the distribution of the population by the number of working
hours per week. We work with the data for the year 1994 to keep consistency with the years for which we have
information on pre-tax inequality.
43 In the case in which there is a minor peak adjacent to the mode we have grouped the two observations (for
example for Germany there are two peaks: 38 and 40 hours).
44Using the data reported in Rubery et al. (1998), which report the full distribution of hours without aggregating
those working more than 50 hours, we obtain a peak at 40 hours with 13% of workers. This is the data used in
Figure 4 for the UK.
45Concerning the US labour market, Autor et al. (2006) document that wage inequality in the top half of the
distribution has displayed a sustained and smooth secular rise for the last 25 years. Kuhn and Lozano (2005) point
out that the polarization of labour supply increased overtime work and that in 2002, the best-paid 20 percent
were twice as likely to work long hours as the bottom 20 percent. Also they nd that this phenomenon cannot
be attributed to decreased unionization.
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We have so far referred to the dispersion of work hours rather than to the average level of
labour supply. In our model aggregate labour supply depends negatively on the tax rate, as
would be expected. The direct e¤ect of increased inequality, for any given tax rate, also has a
negative e¤ect.46 It follows that, for the range of inequality values for which the equilibrium
tax increases in response to inequality, aggregate labour supply unambiguously decreases as
inequality rises. However, as inequality enters the range where the chosen tax decreases there
will be two opposing forces at work. In this range, the net e¤ect will depend idiosyncratically on
the magnitude of these opposing forces. But in principle, if inequality in the US is su¢ ciently
high that it lies in the region of decreasing taxes, then it is consistent with the model that
average labour supply in the US would exceed that in most EU countries, which is indeed the
case. Recently, Prescott (2004) has pointed out that Americans actually work 50% more than
Germans, French and Italians and argues that most of the observed di¤erence is explained by the
di¤erent degree of income taxation. The understanding of the actual sources of these di¤erences
is an object of lively debate.47
Inequality and Individual Attitudes. The model delivers implications concerning in-
dividual moral attitudes toward work and toward the poor. Concerning individual attitudes,
from Proposition 2 in any equilibrum of the model we shall observe a negative relationship be-
tween individual skill level and self-esteem. This is the case since in all equilibria the degree of
moral-intrinsic motivation to work relative to economic incentives is decreasing with skill levels.
Unfortunately data on self-perception or self-esteem in explicit relationship to work values are
not available for the OECD countries we are considering. However, and with the due caution,
it is possible to use directly the data on individual attitudes toward "work as a moral value" to
test our novel prediction of a negative correlation between skill and moral pressure to work.48
Using survey data for eighteen OECD countries, we identify work motivation with the impor-
tance attached to working hardas captured by the degree of agreement with the statement,
Work is a duty towards society.49
According to our model, within each country work values should decrease with skill level,
captured here by the level of educational attainment. Furthermore, this negative relation should
be more pronounced for more unequal countries (with larger di¤erences in earnings), possibly
achieving a maximum for clustered economies. Indeed, the data display a signicant and negative
correlation between individual moral work motivation and skill level in most of the countries and
for most of the variables concerning work.50 Figure 5 plots the relationship between factor-P
46The reason is that a reduction of the relative productivity of the unskilled workers  who are the most
motivated has a stronger negative e¤ect on their labour supply than the positive e¤ect for the less motivated,
highly skilled workers. Therefore, a mean preserving spread in productivity/inequality tends to decrease labour
supply for any given  .
47Rogerson (2005) investigates in detail this striking observation and also nds di¤erential taxation to be key.
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) provide an extensive analysis of the di¤erent attitudes toward labour supply
to explain the observation of large di¤erences in the average work week. They argue that di¤erential taxation
cannot fully explain the observed di¤erences and suggest that the existence of a social multiplier could explain
the observation. Burda et. al. (2006) argue that the data may be explained by di¤erent social norms for leisure.
48We use survey data from the Human Beliefs and Values: a cross-cultural sourcebook based on the 1999-2002
values surveys edited by Inglehart et al. (2004) and the third wave of the survey concerning attitudes toward
the poor (1994). The data consists of information about the respondents income and education level as well as
the degree of agreement with a series of statements (on a ve-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agreeto
strongly disagree).
49Apart from this question (C039), we have also checked (C041) Work should always come rst even if it
means less spare timeand with (C008) on Work vs Leisure. The results are qualitatively very similar.
50The Spearman correlation index displays a statistically signicant negative correlation for all OECD countries
and for all of the various questions on work values. Exceptions are, for C039, Germany and UK where the
distribution of answers is strongly concentrated on the mode and does not display a large variation over skill
levels.
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income inequality and the (absolute) magnitude of the correlation between skill levels and work
motivation.
Figure 5 About Here
The picture also provides some support for the prediction that this negative relation should
be nondecreasing with inequality.51
Concerning social attitudes, the model predicts that in cohesive economies individual social
esteem will be uniformly allocated over the entire population, while in clustered economies
higher inequality will produce an increasing bias in favor of the rich and against the poor. The
model predicts that in cohesive economies, characterized by low dispersion in hours worked and
inequality, we should see no bias against the poor, while in clustered economies we should see a
negative bias, growing with the dispersion in labour supply.
Concerning the altruistic bias, we take the extent to which people attribute the cause of
poverty to laziness as an indicator of lack of concern. Thus, we consider the extent to which
people agree with the statement Poverty is the result of laziness.52
Figure 6 About Here
Figure 6 displays a clear negative association between the concentration in hours worked
(and hence inequality) and bias against the poor, as predicted by the model. Unfortunately,
the number of countries included in this wave of the survey is quite limited. For the US and
Australia, both displaying signicant clustering, the share of the population that is biased against
the poor is nearly three times that in Germany, Sweden or Finland.53
Given its limited nature, the purpose of this simple empirical exercise has not been to provide
irrefutable evidence supporting our model, but rather to show that the available data exhibit
patterns of inequality, redistribution, labour supply and individual attitudes that are broadly
consistent with the model.
7 Concluding remarks
Let us conclude by briey discuss the robustness of our results and the role played by our
simplifying assumptions.
Following the literature in social psychology we have considered the case in which the emo-
tions produced by the deviations from moral standards have a self-regulatory role. Consequently,
we have assumed, in (15), that the MRS between consumption and leisure is decreasing in '
which implies that a drop in ', due to the guilt associated to the failure of meeting the standards,
increases the moral pressure to work. This self-regulation role of changes in self-esteem implies
that moral values and economic incentives are substitutes. The resulting dynamics is stable and
leads to work accordingly with the standards unless inequality is excessively large. For the sake
of completeness, less momentarily entertain the possibility that moral and economic incentives
51Notice that the UK is an outlier in this case. The correlation is not signicant for question C039 while it is
negative and signicant for question C041 (it takes value -0.175, very similar to the one of US which is -0.197).
We have worked with question C039 because it covered a larger number of countries.
52The phrasing of question (E131) is: "Why in your opinion are there people in this country who live in need?
(1) Poor because of laziness and lack of will power. (2) Poor because of an unfair society."
53The data correspond to the following years: Australia 1995, Germany 1997, Finland 1996, Norway 1996,
Sweden 1996 and US 1995. Similarly Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) point out, using the World Values
Survey, that while 60% of Americans believe the poor are lazy, only 26% of Europeans share this belief. Lamont
(2000) documents that in both countries, for manual workers hard work is the main source of self-worth. She
documents, however, important di¤erences concerning the perception of others. While in France, manual workers
value positively redistribution to the poor as a device to avoid social exclusion, the American counterparts
explicitly state that the poor should not be supported because their situation is mainly due to their lack of e¤ort.
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are complements, i.e. the MRS between consumption and leisure is now decreasing in '. In
that case, a reduction in self-esteem, following from the failure to meet the standards, works
as a negative rather than a positive pressure on labor supply. In spite of inverting the e¤ects
of guilt on labor supply, cohesive equilibria would still be possible only for low inequality and
would vanish as soon as the di¤erence in economic incentives is too large. The di¤erence would
be that now these cohesive equilibria are unstable so that the clustered equilibria become the
absorbing state).54 Therefore the possibility to sustain cohesive equilibria with work standards
does not depend on the substitutability between economic and moral incentives but rather on
the relative strength of the two. This implies that the role of self-regulatory emotions is to insure
the stability rather then the mere existence of cohesive equilibria.
Related to this point, notice that the politico-economic implications do not depend on the
self-regulatory role of self-esteem. Assuming complementarity between moral pressure and wages
would imply that the only stable equilibria are clustered. The degree of social clustering would
be, however, increasing with inequality. This implies that, in particular, the non monotonicy of
equilibrium redistribution, which is driven by the progressive increase of the bias in the allocation
of social esteem, still emerges.
In our analysis of politico-economic equilibrium individual private utility was assumed to be
additively separable and linear in income. This is common in the literature and in our view does
not play a key role in establishing the qualitative results. The specic assumption concerning
preferences for leisure does not seem to play a signicant role either. Clearly, by assuming lin-
earity of the total utility function, we have excluded an important impetus for redistribution,
namely, inequality aversion. Hence, the equilibrium tax rates obtained in the paper are likely
to be lower than if social preferences were strictly concave. Also, the nonmonotonicity of redis-
tribution with respect to inequality, which is driven by the increasing bias in the allocation of
social esteem, does not depend on the actual formulation of the utility function. The argument
that in a cohesive equilibrium low productivity individuals should compensate for low monetary
rewards with a higher sense of obligation clearly does not depend on the actual specication of
individual preferences, nor does the fact that in clustered equilibrium the skilled workers would
choose to work more than the unskilled.
As in Meltzer and Richard (1981) we have assumed that production is proportional to total
e¤ective labour supply. It is plain that nothing essential would change had we assumed output
to be a strictly concave function of total e¤ective labour. The implicit assumption of innite
substitutability among the di¤erent types of labour may be more signicant. One might suspect
that the degree of complementarity among di¤erent types of labour could play a role in the
development of self-esteem as well as esteem for others. However, that is not the case. In a
previous version of the paper we considered the entire class of CES production functions, and
we established that the degree of substitutability has no e¤ect on the qualitative results.
For simplicity, we have restricted our attention to two productivity types. The implication
of including a larger number of types requires a more detailed discussion. Indeed, one might
suspect that this is the main cause of the existence of a clustered socioeconomic equilibrium. We
have explored this possibility in our earlier work. With additional types, the analysis becomes
more complex and richer, but the main insights remain the same. With an arbitrary number of
productivity levels, there still exist cohesive socioeconomic equilibria in which everyone conforms
to the social norm. Also, clustered equilibria continue to exist, with a threshold type dividing
those who work above the mean from those who work below. However, in this case, there
may exist equilibria with a third cluster consisting of individuals with intermediate ability each
supplying the mean quantity of labour. Such three-cluster equilibria are hybrids, exhibiting some
54 In fact, in the appendix we show for the case with linear utility and complementarity, that the maximum
level of inequality which allow to sustain cohesive equilibria is exactly the same as for the case of substitutability.
These equilibria are, however, unstable and co-exists with stable clustering equilibria.
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of the attributes of cohesive equilibria and some of clustered equilibria. For those individuals who
conform to the social norm, the relationship between monetary and moral rewards would be the
same as in a cohesive equilibrium. Social concern would be inversely related to productivity. Also
as in cohesive equilibrium, one nds that the range of productivities among those individuals
conforming to the mean, hence the size of the group, depends on the degree of inequality in
productivities and on the degree of redistribution.
Politico-economic equilibria are characterized similarly as for two types only. It can easily
be veried that for the linear quadratic case, indirect preferences over tax rates are single-
peaked for any number of types.55 This guarantees the existence of a voting equilibrium with
the equilibrium tax rate being that chosen by the median among the distribution of peaks.
With general utility functions the determination of the voting equilibrium is substantially more
complicated, and additional restrictions must be imposed to guarantee the existence of a majority
rule equilibrium. In that case, while the main features of the di¤erent equilibria are unchanged,
we cannot be certain that the comparative static analysis would be una¤ected.
55 Indirect utility is quadratic in  and strictly decreasing at  = 1: This rules out any source of non-single-
peakedness.
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8 Appendix. Proofs and Figures
Proof of Proposition 1. Given that labour supply is monotonically increasing in individ-
ual productivity i from (20), we know that Lu( ; u; ) < Ls( ; s; ) and Lu( ; u; ) <
Ls( ; s; ).
It is necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a cohesive equilibrium that Lu( ; u; ) 
Ls( ; s; ), i.e., that there is some L that satises (17) for both u and s at T = L and
that every such L is a cohesive SE equilibrium labour supply in which ('u; 's) solves (23) for
i = u; s. We next show that under these conditions clustered equilibria cannot emerge. Suppose
Lu( ; u; )  Ls( ; s; ) and, to the contrary, suppose there is also a clustered equilibrium in
which L = (Lu; Ls), Lu 6= Ls. First, if Lu < Ls, since this is stationary, it must be that 'u = '
and 's = '. But then Lu = Lu( ; u; ) and Ls = Ls( ; s; ), which contradicts Lu( ; u; ) >
Ls( ; s; ). Alternatively, if Lu > Ls, then in this case stationarity implies 'u = ' and 's = '.
Hence, Lu = Lu( ; u; ) and Ls = Ls( ; s; ). Therefore, Lu( ; u; ) > Ls( ; s; ). Since
Ls( ; s; ) > Lu( ; u; ), as shown above, this implies Lu( ; u; ) > Lu( ; u; ), which is
also a contradiction. It remains to be shown that Lu( ; u; ) < Ls( ; s; ) is su¢ cient for the
existence of a clustered equilibrium. However, if Lu( ; u; ) < Ls( ; s; ) and 'u = ' and
's = ', then the conditions of the denition of a clustered SE equilibrium are clearly satised.
Finally, compatible values of  can be derived from (14) and (11) as stated in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Rearrange (30) to get
@vu
@c
(1 + u(1  u))

y   yu +  dy
d

=  uu@vs
@c

y   ys +  dy
d

. (53)
Since the RHS of this is positive, the LHS must be positive as well which implies
y   yu +  dy
d
> 0. (54)
If that is the case, then from (29) dud > 0 at 
u . Hence u < m, or the level of redistribution
preferred by the poor is smaller than in the egoistic case.
A larger u increases the weight of the social part relative to the egoistic one and accordingly
reduces the demand for taxation on the part of the poor in any interior optimum. From implicit
di¤erentiation we have,
sign
@u
@u
= sign

 @
2Vu=@@u
@2Vu=@2

=
= sign

(1  u)@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d

+ u
@vs
@c

y   ys +  dy
d

from (54) and from (30) noting that @2Vu=@2

u
< 0 by (31) we have that
@u
@u
< 0:
.
(ii) As for the preferences of the skilled workers we have that
@vs
@c
(1 + ss)

y   ys +  dy
d

+ (1  s)s@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d

 0. (55)
Since
h
y   ys +  dyd
i
< 0, a purely egoistic skilled worker would optimally choose  = 0 (from
the analogue of (29) for s). The same is true if s is altruistic but the inequality in (55) is strict.
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In that case, after taking into consideration the e¤ects of taxation on both the egoistic and
the social components of utility, the skilled workers would continue to oppose redistribution.
However, if (55) holds with equality, then
@vs
@c
(1 + ss)

y   ys +  dy
d

=   (1  s)s@vu
@c

y   yu +  dy
d

. (56)
As in (i), this implies
h
y   yu +  dyd
i
> 0 at the solution  s . Hence  s < m as well. Next we
show that u >  s even in the case in which  s > 0, that is, when (56) holds with equality. Now,
we compare the coe¢ cients of the positive expression @vu@c
h
y   yu +  dyd
i
in (56) and (53). By
(8) and (12), u = s in a stationary equilibrium, and by denition, 0  1  u  1. Also, the
maximal feasible range of (s u) is  1 < s u < 1. Therefore, 1+u(1 u) > (1  s)s.
Alternatively, comparing the coe¢ cients of the negative expression @vs@c
h
y   ys +  dyd
i
, we have
that 1 + ss > uu. Taken together, these imply that in (30),
dVu()
d > 0 at 
s. Hence,
u >  s  0.
Proof of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. The rst order condition for labour supply
can be expressed as
[(1  )iLi + T ]  (1  )i = f 0
 
L  Li

'i.
Therefore in a cohesive SE equilibrium where Li = L for all i, and T = L, this can be written
as
f 0
 
L  LL = (1='i) [(1  )i + ]  (1  )i,
where the LHS is strictly increasing in L while the RHS is independent of L. From this
expression, we have that (25) in Proposition 1 holds if and only if 
1='

[(1  )u + ]  u  (1=') [(1  )s + ]  s.
Rearranging the last expression, we have that a cohesive SE equilibrium exists if and only if
u
s
1=


'
'
1= (1  )u + 
(1  )s + 

. (57)
After some manipulation (57) can be rewritten as

'
'
1= e1= 
24e (1  ) + 

(1  ) e + 
(1  ) + 

(1  ) e + 
35 = (58)
=
e (1  ) +  (1  ) e +  (1  )
(1  ) + 

(1  ) e +  =
= 1  (1  )
(1  ) + 

(1  ) e +  ,
which can nally be expressed as
H
e  e1=  '
'
1=8<:1 

1  e
1 + (=(1  ))

(1  ) e + 
9=;  Ge; 

'
'
1=
.
(59)
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Consider the RHS and the LHS of (59) in the space e 2 [0; 1]. First, H (:) is strictly
increasing and either strictly concave for  > 1, strictly convex for  < 1, or linear for  = 1.
Also, H(0) = 0 and H(1) = 1.
Notice that G
e;  is strictly increasing in  with Ge; 0 = e and Ge; 1 = 1. In
particular denote by e1 the level of relative productivity such that (59) is satised with equality
for  = 1. This is given by e1 = '' < 1. (60)
Also, denote by e0 2 [0; 1] the relative productivity at which (59) is satised with equality for
 = 0, which is given by56
e0 = ''
 1
1 
< 1 for any   1 and e0 = 0 for any  > 1.
Clearly, for  > 1, e1 > e0. But also for   1, since '' < 1 and 11  > 1, e1 > e0. Therefore we
have an upper bound e1 (that is, a lower bound for inequality) such that for any e  e1 only
cohesive SE equilibria exist and a lower bound e0 such that for any e < e0 only clustered SE
equilibria exist. This proves Proposition 5.
Proposition 4 is proved by noting that by the monotonicity of G
e;  in  and the Inter-
mediate Value Theorem, for any e0 2 he0; e1i there always exists a unique interior  e0 such
that if  > 
e0, then only clustered equilibria are possible, while if    e0, only cohesive
equilibria exist. Also the larger e0 the larger the required  necessary to make the functions
H
e and Ge; ''1= cross exactly at e0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Substituting I from (47) into (49) and restricting attention to
the distributions of sentiments compatible with cohesive equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium
level of redistribution  = (   u) = (2   u + u). This tax rate must be jointly compatible
with optimal labour supply. Hence, using this expression for  together with (35) we obtain
the expression for the locus
TT : L = (1  )2u(   u)= () , (61)
which is a strictly decreasing function for  < 1 which takes innite value and slope at  = 0
and zero value and slope at  = 1.
Note that (61) can be written as
L = (1  )2uI=. (62)
This implies that whenever condition (46) is satised then bu (I)  1, and for any u 2
[bu (I) ; 1] there exists a unique vector (Lu (u) ;  c (u)) in which Li (i) = L (u) satises the
rst order condition for optimal labour supply (35) for i = u; s, and  c (u) is the equilibrium
tax rate (44). The computation of the extreme values of  in (51) is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2. The range of inequality I for which the economy is in a cohe-
sive/clustered SE equilibrium is characterized in Propositions 7 and 8. From (10) and (35), in
any clustered equilibrium the bias in social sentiments is given by
u =
u
(1  ) 2u + s
. (63)
56One solution is always e0 = 0 while the second solution is in the range [0; 1] only if   1.
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In this case the magnitude of the distributive bias  is given by
 =
(y   eyu)
y
=
(1  ) 22u + 2s   (1  u)22u   u2s
(1  ) 22u + 2s
. (64)
Using (63) and rearranging, we can express the numerator of (64) as
(1  ) 22u + 2s   22u +
s
(1  ) 2u + s
 
22u   2s

=

 
2s   22u

1  s
(1  ) 2u + s

=   (1  )
 
2s   22u

(s   2u)
(1  ) 2u + s
.
Therefore,
(I) =   (1  ) 1  2
e
 + (1  ) 2e 1  2
e2
 + (1  ) 2e2 < 0 for e < 12 .
Computing the level of income inequality one gets
I =


1  2e2
 + (1  ) 2e2 , (65)
which implies
 =   (1  ) I 1  2
e
 + (1  ) 2e < 0.
From (65) we have
@I
@e =   4e + (1  ) 2e22 < 0. (66)
The bias in social sentiments is increasing in I since
@
@I
=   (1  ) 1  2
e
 + (1  ) 2e + I @@e
0@  (1  ) 1  2e
 + (1  ) 2e
1A @e
@I
= (67)
=

I
+ 2I (1  ) @
e
@I
< 0,
which proves the statement.
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) For the minimum equilibrium tax rate in any cohesive PE
equilibrium, m, the statement follows by simple di¤erentiation. Substituting for K in (52),
the maximum tax rate is
M =
I
I+(1 I)
(1 I) + I
=
I (1  I)
I +  (1  I) + I (1  I) =

A+ 
where A =

1
1 I +

I

. Hence,
@M
@I
=   
( +A)2
@A
@I
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where @A@I =
1
(1 I)2  

I2
.
For the maximum I compatible with cohesive PE equilibrium, namely, I = 1  , we have
@A(I)
@I =
1
(1 I)2
 
1  1

< 0. Since @
2A
@I2
= 2
(1 I)3 +
2
I3
> 0, this is su¢ cient to show @

M
@I > 0 for
all I  I.
(ii) From Lemma 2, in clustered equilibrium  (I) < 0 and @@I < 0. And from Proposition 8
the equilibrium level of redistribution is  (I) = +I2++I . Therefore,
@ o
@I
=
1
(2 +  + I)2

1 +
@
@I

? 0() 1 ?
@@I
 .
Recall that I = I = 1+ , e = 1=2, and (I) = 0. Then from (66) evaluated at e = 1=2 we
obtain
@e
@I

I=I
=  (1 + )
2
8
.
Hence, from (67) we have @
o
@I

I=I
= 1
(2+I)
2

3 2
4

> 0. Notice also that from Proposition 8,
there exists a level of inequality I 0 > I such that  o = 0. Hence, by continuity of  o (I) and by
Intermediate Value Theorem there exists a level Is for which  o is maximal.
Redistribution as a function of the Gini Index. From Proposition 9 we know that
redistribution is maximal for some I > I and the maximum value it is implicitly characterized
by maximizing (44). Denote the preferred level of redistribution as function of inequality as
 = (I). Di¤erentiating, we have
d = 0(I)dI. (68)
Computing the Gini index for disposable income, we get G = (1  ) (1  ) I. By totally
di¤erentiating we have
dI =
1
(1  ) (1  )dG+
G
(1  )2 (1  )d .
Substituting and rearranging,
d

1  
0(I)G
(1  )2 (1  )

= dG
0(I)
(1  ) (1  ) .
Therefore,
d
dG
=
0(I) (1  )
(1  )2 (1  )  0(I)G = 0, 
0(I) = 0, (69)
which implies that the change in redistribution as a function of the Gini index co-moves with
the change in pre-tax income inequality I.
Self-esteem and labor supply. To illustrate the role of regulatory function of self-
conscious emotions, consider the case in which moral motivation and wages are complements
rather than substitute. Contrary to (15) assume instead that:
d
d'i

vl
vc

< 0. (70)
In the case of linear-quadratic utility function adopted in Section 5 this can be formalized by
assuming that,
v(ci; Li; 'i) = ci +

1  L
2
i
2

1
'i
(71)
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which delivers an optimal labor supply,
Li (i; 'i; ) = (1  )i'i (72)
instead of Li (i; 'i; ) = (1  ) i'i . Therefore ' and  are complements rather than substitute
for labor e¤ort. This implies that an increase in self-esteem ' leads to an increase rather than
a reduction in labor supply. In this case the maximum labor supply, for any i, is attained at
'i = ' rather than at 'i = ' as in the text.
From the Proof of Proposition 5 we know that for the utility formulation (33) there exists a
maximum level of productivity ratio given by
e1  us = ''
such that for any e > e1 only cohesive equilibria exists while for any e < e1 only clustered
equilibria exists. Repeating the logic of the argument with the utility formulation (71) we have
that in a cohesive equilibrium it must be,
Lu (u; 'u; ) = Lu (u; 'u; )() u'u = s's (73)
As in the text an increase in the productivity spread leads skilled workers to work relative more.
This can be compensated, however, by a reduction in their self-esteem. Therefore a cohesive
equilibrium can be sustained as long as
u'  s'() e  us  '' (74)
which is the same threshold as in the case considered in the text. This implies that cohesive
equilibria can be sustained only if inequality in productivity is not too large. What allows to
sustain cohesive equilibria is not the substitutability between economic and moral incentives but
rather on relative strength between the two. Notice however that a cohesive equilibrium as (73)
is not stable. Any deviation leads dynamically to a clustered equilibrium. Consider e.g. the
case in which Ls > Lu. From the dynamic evolution of self-esteem and social esteem (12) and
(13) this leads to an increase in 's and a decrease in 'u. As result we observe a further increase
in the gap Ls   Lu. The process continues until a clustered equilibrium with 's = ' , 'u = '
and Ls (') > Lu
 
'

.57 As in the text, this clustered equilibrium is unique when inequality is
su¢ ciently large, i.e. e = us < '' . Hence the role of self-regulatory function of changes in
self-esteem, as in (15), is to lead to the emergence and to insure the stability of moral standards.
Finally notice that the result on the non monotonicity of redistribution do not depends on the
role of self-esteem for labor supply since it is induced by the increasing bias against the poor in
clustered equilibria.
57 In fact in this case a clustered equilibrium with 'u = ', 's = ' and Lu (') > Ls
 
'

can also be sustained.
This equilibrium, however, disappears when inequality is su¢ ciently large, that is if e < '
'
.
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Figure 1: Cohesive Stationary Equilibria
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Figure 2: Inequality, Social Cohesion and Redistribution
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Figure 3: Factor Income Inequality and Redistribution
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Figure 4: Factor Income Inequality and Dispersion in Hours Work
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Figure 5: Correlation between Skills/Work Values and Factor Income Inequality
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Figure 6: Perception of Poor as Lazy and Dispersion in Hours Work
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